Is There Proof That Objects Exist Independent of Mind? - Page 3

Nick_A · #21 (**permalink**) 15th December 2007, 04:48 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by modus_tollens

Seems to me to be equivalent to "if a tree falls in a forest with no one around, does it make a sound?"

That kind of question is so hypothetical, it's difficult to comprehend. "If I didn't have a mind, would this keyboard still exist?" I can't imagine not having a mind...

The trouble withe solipsism is that it is bounded by our mind. The efforts to "Know thyself" can allow the mind to become conscious. This awareness is something completely different then the mind preaching solipsism How is a dual reactive mind lacking consciousness supposed to grasp the external world without first experiencing our inner world?

The conscious universe can only be experienced consciously and since a human being is a microcosm and essentially a mini universe, it can only be known consciously. When we can consciously "know thyself," we can know the objective quality of our universe.

modus_tollens · #22 (**permalink**) 23rd December 2007, 04:32 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Nick_A

The trouble withe solipsism is that it is bounded by our mind.

OK but what if the mind is unbounded?

Quote:

Originally Posted by Nick_A

The conscious universe can only be experienced consciously and since a human being is a microcosm and essentially a mini universe, it can only be known consciously. When we can consciously "know thyself," we can know the objective quality of our universe.

A camera can perceive, thus experience, a dialog between two conscious humans. Now attach that camera to a computer with speech recognition software. Now attach that understanding of the conversation to an artificial intelligence. Perhaps we are that artificial intelligence, the cameras our eyes, the speech recognition and AI just different modules within our minds. Dumb but fast. Not truly conscious but appearing so. I can make my computer print the message "I am conscious" a thousand times; it doesn't make it so. The same is true for what comes out of my mouth, or what spills onto this keyboard.

I do like the idea that an individual is a microcosm for the universe, thus knowing one's self is to know the objective reality. I'm just not at all convinced that what's "out there" is a reflection of anything, least of all me. Nor am I convinced that what's "in here" is a reflection of what's "out there." What's "in here" is influenced by a minuscule part of what's "out there"; a stretch to say either is a reflection of the other.

Of course, that's assuming that what's "out there" is not equal to what's "in here," that my perception of separation is truth. Perceptions can deceive, after all.

Who knows

modus_tollens · #23 (**permalink**) 23rd December 2007, 04:39 AM

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The Incoherence of Solipsism

With the belief in the essential privacy of experience eliminated as false, the last presupposition underlying solipsism is removed and solipsism is shown as foundationless, in theory and in fact. One might even say, solipsism is necessarily foundationless, for to make an appeal to logical rules or empirical evidence the solipsist would implicitly have to affirm the very thing that he purportedly refuses to believe: the reality of intersubjectively valid criteria and a public, extra-mental world. There is a temptation to say that solipsism is a false philosophical theory, but this is not quite strong or accurate enough. As a theory, it is incoherent. What makes it incoherent, above all else, is that the solipsist requires a language (that is a sign-system) to think or to affirm his solipsistic thoughts at all. Given this, it is scarcely surprising that those philosophers who accept the Cartesian premises that make solipsism apparently plausible, if not inescapable, have also invariably assumed that language-usage is itself essentially private. The cluster of arguments - generally referred to as "the private language argument" - that we find in the Investigations against this assumption effectively administers the coup de grâce to both Cartesian dualism and solipsism. (I. § 202; 242-315). Language is an irreducibly public form of life that is encountered in specifically social contexts. Each natural language-system contains an indefinitely large number of "language-games," governed by rules that, though conventional, are not arbitrary personal fiats. The meaning of a word is its (publicly accessible) use in a language. To question, argue, or doubt is to utilize language in a particular way. It is to play a particular kind of public language-game. The proposition "I am the only mind that exists" makes sense only to the extent that it is expressed in a public language, and the existence of such language itself implies the existence of a social context. Such a context exists for the hypothetical last survivor of a nuclear holocaust, but not for the solipsist. A non-linguistic solipsism is unthinkable and a thinkable solipsism is necessarily linguistic. Solipsism therefore presupposes the very thing that it seeks to deny. That solipsistic thoughts are thinkable in the first instance implies the existence of the public, shared, intersubjective world that they purport to call into question.

How is it ruled out undoubtedly that what is public is not an illusion? That and even perhaps some or all of what goes on privately?

Seems this argument is [there is a public] IMPLIES [solipsism is incoherent]. And since [solipsism is incoherent] is equivalent to [there is a public], this really seems circular to me: [there is a public] IMPLIES [there is a public]. Correct me if I'm wrong. How is this argument NOT circular?

evangelicalhumanist · #24 (**permalink**) 23rd December 2007, 02:37 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by modus_tollens

How is it ruled out undoubtedly that what is public is not an illusion? That and even perhaps some or all of what goes on privately?

Seems this argument is [there is a public] IMPLIES [solipsism is incoherent]. And since [solipsism is incoherent] is equivalent to [there is a public], this really seems circular to me: [there is a public] IMPLIES [there is a public]. Correct me if I'm wrong. How is this argument NOT circular?

It is an interesting fact that some of the most abstruse problems in philosophy contain some element of self-reference in them. I would imagine that solipsism is one of the more spectacular varieties, especially in its strong form.

Often, as Russell pointed out, we must fall back on the question "what reason(s) have we to suppose such-and-such?" I think we have to go further, as well, and ask, "what are the consequences of supposing it?"

I can see that one of the reasons for supposing solipsism to be a valid position is the acknowledgement that everything which we perceive is of necessity presented to our awareness through transceived sense-data, and one may suppose both that the sense data has been changed such that our perception does not reflect the real world, or even further, that our sense data does not exist, and we are really nothing more (figuratively) than "the brain in a vat."

Now personally, I think that this argues for a massive amount of processing power for this brain in a vat, something so extremely unlikely as to rule it out. For example, I must somehow be capable of having created quantum mechanics, and having done so, have also managed to create my lack of understanding of it, along with my concurrent creation of other people who do understand it (which understanding has been written in books, also my creation, I must suppose), which I am still unable to fully grasp. Pretty amazing stuff.

Now, thinking through consequences: let's suppose that I, the sole solipsist (if you will), for whatever reason commit a series of murders, and am eventually sentenced to death. I admit that it is entirely possible that when that sentence (created by me) is carried out, the universe will cease to exist -- for me. But the question becomes, does it cease to exist in reality, for everybody else (even though, of course, in my solipsistic fantasy there is nobody else)?

Hard question to answer, unless we transfer it to, say, Timoth McVeigh. He's dead, yet the universe lives on (for me, anyway). So of course it is obvious that, Mr. McVeigh could not have been the sole solipsist. Or perhaps Mr. McVeigh was not a reality at all. Maybe he's just part of my creation.

This sort of argument could go on forever, but the fact remains that if reality is created by me, it is extremely difficult to imagine how a public, similarly created by me, can have knowledge that I cannot. And if I am not real, but only a portion of a world created by "The Solipsist," then the task becomes to find out who that solipsist might be. Would we have to kill everybody, one by one, until we finally got the right one and it all disappeared?

Of course, that's just the beginning of the consideration of the consequences of hard solipsism. Remember, said solipsist would have had to have created all of history, as well. So if I'm the one, then I've created rather a lot of religions that I've also, somehow, managed not to believe in.

No, the more I wander around solipsism of that order, the more I consider it to be a foolish waste of mental energy.

modus_tollens · #25 (**permalink**) 23rd December 2007, 09:58 PM

First of all, your response doesn't answer the question so as far as I'm concerned that argument against solipsism stands circular.

Then again, exposing the invalidity of an argument against solipsism is by no means evidence for solipsism.

Quote:

Originally Posted by evangelicalhumanist

Often, as Russell pointed out, we must fall back on the question "what reason(s) have we to suppose such-and-such?" I think we have to go further, as well, and ask, "what are the consequences of supposing it?"

I will for the moment buy into the claim that if the answer to the second question includes two contradictory propositions, then the original supposition is, at least, highly suspect, and at most, false. That would be a true reductio ad absurdam (sp?): that two consequences of the solipsism hypothesis directly contradict each other. When P IMPLIES (Q and not Q), then I will buy into the notion for now that implies not P. I suppose this could be called hard RAA; the soft version of RAA you seem to be employing is that the consequences of the solipsism hypothesis seem, to you, to be absurd and, therefore, solipsism is untenable. That is not a logical argument; at least, it's not true RAA. But that brings me to my second paragraph above.

Now as for your first question, or Russell's first question, regarding solipsism, let me try another answer. What reason(s) do we have to suppose solipsism? A step in the direction is the Cartesian dictum de omnibus dubitandum (doubt everything). For me, solipsism is not ruled out because of these assertions:
We can't know whether our perceptions are an accurate reflection of a reality or that they have anything to do with reality (akin to a dream state)

Our faculty for discriminating the real from the unreal is not necessarily infallible

We may not be who or what we think we are, or anything close to it

Everything can be doubted, even the reality of our perceptions of what appears to be an external universe and our perceptions of what appears to be an internal, private universe

Quote:

Originally Posted by evangelicalhumanist

Now personally, I think that this argues for a massive amount of processing power for this brain in a vat, something so extremely unlikely as to rule it out. For example, I must somehow be capable of having created quantum mechanics, and having done so, have also managed to create my lack of understanding of it, along with my concurrent creation of other people who do understand it (which understanding has been written in books, also my creation, I must suppose), which I am still unable to fully grasp. Pretty amazing stuff.

The brain in that vat is unlikely to be a human brain, I'll grant that. However, if that brain belongs to something billions of years ahead of us, an artilect for example, then it's not inconceivable. The argument there seems to be that it is unlikely and probably not true but I question the true odds of that kind of processing power existing somewhere. I was looking for a fascinating web site called the Artilect War but it has been removed. The best I could find was this: KurzweilAI.net (note the Artilect War link at the bottom is dead). This would be artilects developed by humans perhaps a few centuries from now; imagine artilects developed by others billions of years ago that have been evolving for a long time. Now basing an argument on science fiction probably doesn't seem very strong. However, I'm just giving a reason why "that kind of processing power is unlikely" is not as certain as you think, given that that processing power need not at all belong to a human.

Quote:

Originally Posted by evangelicalhumanist

Now, thinking through consequences: let's suppose that I, the sole solipsist (if you will), for whatever reason commit a series of murders, and am eventually sentenced to death. I admit that it is entirely possible that when that sentence (created by me) is carried out, the universe will cease to exist -- for me. But the question becomes, does it cease to exist in reality, for everybody else (even though, of course, in my solipsistic fantasy there is nobody else)?

Hard question to answer, unless we transfer it to, say, Timoth McVeigh. He's dead, yet the universe lives on (for me, anyway). So of course it is obvious that, Mr. McVeigh could not have been the sole solipsist. Or perhaps Mr. McVeigh was not a reality at all. Maybe he's just part of my creation.

This sort of argument could go on forever, but the fact remains that if reality is created by me, it is extremely difficult to imagine how a public, similarly created by me, can have knowledge that I cannot. And if I am not real, but only a portion of a world created by "The Solipsist," then the task becomes to find out who that solipsist might be. Would we have to kill everybody, one by one, until we finally got the right one and it all disappeared?

If I am The Solipsist, then I have no idea who I am and I'm probably not, in truth, at all human, and only can glimpse at what my boundaries are. What goes on in the illusion (like someone dying), if it is an illusion, can't really give me knowledge as to whether or not it is an illusion, bringing me back to the second assertion, "Our faculty for discriminating the real from the unreal is not necessarily infallible."

...Then again, if everything is to be doubted, then "de omnibus dubitandum" should also be doubted...

evangelicalhumanist · #26 (**permalink**) 24th December 2007, 01:53 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by modus_tollens

First of all, your response doesn't answer the question so as far as I'm concerned that argument against solipsism stands circular.

Apologies. I sort of hinted that I agree when I said that philosophy's hardest problems often contain some self-reference, or circularity. Philosophers have been fighting about them for millenia, with no clear winner in sight. However, there are "vicious" circles and non-vicious ones. Non-vicious ones are circular arguments but for which some sort of independent reason may be acceptable as another answer to one of the parts of the argument. That's the reason for Russell's question (and my corollary).

And that, I think, is likely to be my ultimate answer to the question, and all of the very good examples that you put forth. Yes, they may all be arguments for a solipsist viewpoint, and they are very difficult to dispense with on purely rational grounds.

However, and I go back to your last point: "...Then again, if everything is to be doubted, then 'de omnibus dubitandum' should also be doubted..."

And in order to retain my sanity (such as it is) I have made a purely emotional decision to suppose that my reasons for choosing a purely mental world constructed by some giant intellect somewhere, of which I am nothing more than a "running subroutine" are not nearly as good as my reasons for supposing that there is a reality of some kind, and I can perceive and participate in it in some fashion.

It ain't logic. But then, I'm not Spock.

modus_tollens · #27 (**permalink**) 24th December 2007, 06:56 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by evangelicalhumanist

And in order to retain my sanity (such as it is) I have made a purely emotional decision to suppose that my reasons for choosing a purely mental world constructed by some giant intellect somewhere, of which I am nothing more than a "running subroutine" are not nearly as good as my reasons for supposing that there is a reality of some kind, and I can perceive and participate in it in some fashion.

Sanity is, perhaps, so overrated. I've asked myself many times if I would trade my sanity for knowing the TRUTH, if that's what I had to trade. I think, though, that if solipsism were accepted, that you would be the tip of the iceberg of The Solipsist, rather than being a part of The Solipsist's illusion (a subroutine).

For me, solipsism was at first an intellectual curiosity that I couldn't rationally dispense with but chose not to agree with pretty much for the same reasons as you. Then at some point, I not only believed solipsism but I was (am?) The Solipsist. Somewhere along the way, I figured that The Solipsist must be God, and I was a subroutine in its intellect, if it could be called such, being as advanced as it is. Now I am akin to a solipsistic agnostic, believing I will never know whether or not solipsism is the most accurate description of reality, there being one consciousness (akin to nonduality), or not. And, therefore, I sometimes think thinking about solipsism is a waste of mental energy as well, but not because it's false.

Mental energy, unlike energy derived from oil, seems to me to be continuously renewable, though.

I came across this pic a couple of years ago, I thought you'd get a kick out of it. It appears to be a cybernetic brain in a vat, perhaps an artilect? Kind of funny to me to think I might be a couple of symbols it is processing...

Eolas Pellor · #28 (**permalink**) 25th December 2007, 04:53 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by evangelicalhumanist

Now personally, I think that this argues for a massive amount of processing power for this brain in a vat, something so extremely unlikely as to rule it out. .

Science catches up to philosophy that is 2500 years old, apparently.

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The brain has 100 billion neurons but scientists had thought they needed to join forces in larger networks to produce thoughts and sensations.

The Dutch and German study, published in Nature, found that stimulating just one rat neuron could deliver the sensation of touch.

Well, that pretty much puts paid to the processing problem. Whole story here.

"Be seeing you...."

modus_tollens · #29 (**permalink**) 25th December 2007, 09:20 PM

If it's conceivable that a human brain can conjure all this up, then that makes it seem less likely that the brain in a vat scenario can be summarily ruled out due to its unlikelihood. More so if that brain in that vat is not a human brain but perhaps something that, to us, would be billions of years more advanced. Maybe in a parallel universe, time runs really slowly compared to ours and one nanosecond in it is a billion years here and an artilect brain in a vat has been evolving, learning, and processing for billions of years in that universe, which is a really long time in our universe.

*

Maybes and perhapses don't prove anything but they're not meant to. Except that I find it difficult to accept the argument "it can be ruled out due to its unlikelihood."

Quote:

Originally Posted by Me

Sanity is, perhaps, so overrated. I've asked myself many times if I would trade my sanity for knowing the TRUTH, if that's what I had to trade. I think, though, that if solipsism were accepted, that you would be the tip of the iceberg of The Solipsist, rather than being a part of The Solipsist's illusion (a subroutine).

What I mean by that is that if the truth is that everything I thought I KNEW and everything I believed is 180 degrees opposite from the truth, then, in those times, I find sanity difficult to hold on to, nor am I particularly motivated to try to hold on to it.

*they say the eyes are the window to the soul

To paraphrase Nietzsche, when you look into The Solipsist's brain, it also looks into you...

modus_tollens · #30 (**permalink**) 27th December 2007, 07:33 PM

[Appeal to authority...]

Quote:

Originally Posted by Eolas Pellor

...is the sign of a weak, very weak, argument.

No. It was a strawman argument because you were attributing arguments to Viv and I that we had not made. You then proceed to attempt to demolish those, spurious, arguments. And that IS a strawman, no matter what your source.

And that cannot be lain at the feet of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, or any other source...and it is what you demonstrate your mastery at, yet again.

LOL

Quote:

Originally Posted by Eolas Pellor

Science catches up to philosophy that is 2500 years old, apparently.

Quote:

The brain has 100 billion neurons but scientists had thought they needed to join forces in larger networks to produce thoughts and sensations.

The Dutch and German study, published in Nature, found that stimulating just one rat neuron could deliver the sensation of touch.

Well, that pretty much puts paid to the processing problem. Whole story here.

"Be seeing you...."

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